Schenk: Rights of Legal Resident Aliens

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE
RESTRICTIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
OF LEGAL RESIDENT ALIENS
IN NEW YORK STATE
L

INTRODUCTION

The legal resident alien 1 in the United States today is, by statute, denied access to many occupations and professions. 2 Although
in the early history of the United States the alien was afforded a
warm welcome, United States policy toward aliens has changed
since that time. 3 The change is evident in United States immigration policy. In the country's early years there were virtually no
restrictions upon alien immigration into the United States. Congressional restrictions on aliens were just initiated in 1875.4 Today,
a comprehensive scheme of regulation exists under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. 5
The political rights of aliens who have gained entry into the
United States are also subject to restriction. Twenty-two states
and territories formerly granted aliens or declarant aliens 6 the
right to vote. 7 By the 1928 national elections, however, no alien in
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1976). "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such
status not having changed."
2. See, e.g., occupations cited, note 15 infra.
3. M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946).
4. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Actually, the scope of restriction of this
statute was fairly limited, excluding only felons and prostitutes. As stated in § 5:
[I]t shall be unlawful for aliens of the following classes to immigrate into the
United States, namely, persons who are undergoing a sentence for conviction in
their own country of felonious crimes other than political or growing out of or the
result of such political offenses, or whose sentence has been remitted on condition
of their emigration, and women "imported for the purposes of prostitution."
5. 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1362 (1976).
6. Declarant aliens are those who have "declared their intention to become citizens .... "
Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 114 (1931). Statutes restricting aliens from certain types of employment may sometimes exempt declarant aliens.
See, e.g.. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 3001(3) (McKinney 1970) which states that,
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher
now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to
become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a
citizen.
7. M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 180 (1946).
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any state was eligible to vote for any elected official. 8
At common law there were very few restrictions on an alien's
right to work in this country. 9 Alien labor was seen as essential to
its overall development. 10 A combination of factors, however, led
to the enactment of restrictive legislation in the employment field.
United States citizens often viewed aliens as political radicals and
with fear. In addition, aliens competed with citizens in the job
market. 11 Restrictive legislation thus developed as a result of the
influence of pressure groups hoping to preclude aliens from competing in particular fields. 12
New York has historically been a leading state in the amount
of legislation enacted restricting the entry of aliens into certain
occupations and professions. 13 The first such restrictive statute in
that state was passed in 1871. 14 Following the enactment of this
statute, New York initiated a succession of statutes requiring citizenship, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen, in at
least thirty-eight occupations and professions. 15
Limited progress has been made in the repeal of these statutes.16 Some statutes have been judicially repealed or modified by
8. "For the first time in over a hundred years, a national election was held in 1928 in
which no alien in any state had the right to cast a vote for a candidate for any office- national, state, or local." Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114,
114 (1931).
9. Haralambie, Employment Rights of Resident Aliens in Arizona, 19 ARIZ. L. REV.
409 (1978).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 411.
12. M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 195 (1946).
13. Id. at 196-97.
14. 1871 N.Y. Laws ch. 486, currently N.Y. Jun. LAW§ 460 (McKinney 1968). The statute has no force following In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) although it has not been repealed.
15. Brief for Appellee, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). The occupations listed in
this brief include in order of enactment: attorneys, pawnbrokers, laborers on public employment projects, traffickers in liquor, certified public accountants, blind adult vendors of
goods and newspapers, private investigators, certified shorthand reporters, ship masters,
pilots and engineers, bank directors and trustees, architects, state police officers, teachers,
surveyors, operators of billiard and pocket pool halls, medical doctors, pharmacists, real
estate brokers, embalmers and undertakers, engineers, dentists, forest preserve guides,
nurses, employees of a competitive class in civil service, racing track parti-mutual employees, funeral directors, veterinarians, psychologists, dental hygienists, employees of
private institutions acquired by the state, landscape architects, chiropractors, masseurs and
masseuses, physical therapists and animal health technicians. Id. at 19-22.
16. See, e.g., N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 7305 (McKinney) (repealed 1971) which required citizenship for architects; N.Y. Enuc. LAW§ 7404 (McKinney) (repealed 1971) which required
citizenship for certified public accountants.
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the Supreme Court of the United States or New York state
courts. 17 A substantial number of statutes, however, retain discriminatory citizenship requirements as a prerequisite for certain
professions and occupations. 18
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the most significant
statutory restrictions which remain applicable to the legal resident alien of New York. 19 In order to understand the present and
future status of these statutes, it is necessary to compare them
with past statutory citizenship restrictions. Such an understanding requires an analysis of the constitutional limitations which
have been applied to restrictive statutes. The major limitations to
be examined are the doctrines of federal preem.ption and equal
protection. Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States has established a standard of strict judicial scrutiny for restrictive statutes.
Several recent Supreme Court decisions 20 upholding New York
statutes with citizenship requirements, however, indicate a possible retreat or deviation from this standard. With this background
in mind, the constitutionality of New York's restrictive employment statutes will be considered.

IL

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Legislation restricting aliens as a class is subject to certain
constitutional limitations. State legislation comes under the doctrine of federal preemption when it appears that the state is encroaching upon matters dealt with by federal regulation. Often
restrictive state legislation is declared unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 21
17. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3)
(McKinney 1970) which restricts non-citizens from teacher certification unconstitutional; see
also Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), holding N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
6534(6) (McKinney 1972), which similarly restricts physical therapists_,and N.Y. EDUC. LAW§
7206(1)(6) (McKinney), which similarly restricts engineers, unconstituticmal.
18. See, e.g., N. Y. Eouc. LA w §§ 6554(6) (chiropractors), 6604(6) (dentists), 6805(6)
(pharmacists), 7504(6) (certified shorthand reporters), 7804(6) (masseurs) (McKinney 1972);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 215(3) (state troopers) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§
440(a) (real estate brokers) (McKinney 1968).
19. It is not within the scope of this Note to examine restrictive legislation dealing
with the illegal alien.
20. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 provides that, "No State shall ... deny -to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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Federal Preemption

Under the supremacy clause, the federal government is
granted exclusive control over immigration and naturalization. 22
Congress has specified, in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 23
which aliens are to be admitted and which aliens are to be excluded
from the United States. In Truax v. Raich, 24 the first case holding
constitutional limits on a state's power to limit alien employment,
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an Arizona
statute requiring an employer of five or more persons to hire at
least four citizens out of every five new employees. The Court
decided that control over immigration was vested solely in the
federal government and that a state may not deprive lawfully admitted aliens of the right to earn a living in common occupations of
the community. The Court considered such state legislation tantamount to denying aliens admission into the country and residency.
Though this statute did not directly regulate or control immigration, the deprivation of the right to work acted as an effective
deterrent to immigration. 25 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
federal preemption doctrine in Graham v. Richardson. 26 In that
decision the Court held that state alien residency requirements
encroached upon exclusive federal power and are constitutionally
impermissible. 27
22. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, cl. 4.
23. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976). The aliens denied admis-

sion into the United States by statute include those who are retarded, insane, drug addicts,
and dangerously diseased as well as those who are beggars, polygamists, prostitutes and
anarchists. In relation to employment, the statute excludes all aliens who are "seeking to
enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor," unless
they have received certification through the Secretary of Labor.
24. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
25. Id. at 42.
26. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
27. In Graham, the Court states that, "[t]he National Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period
they may remain, and regulation of their conduct before naturalization .... Pursuant to
that power, Congress has provided, as part of a comprehensive plan for the regulation of
immigration and naturalization ... ."Id. at 377. The Court further states that "[s]tate laws
that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage
conflict with these overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the
Federal Government." Id. at 378. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) a similar view is
expressed. "[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this
field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation ... , states cannot, inconsistently with
the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or compliment, the federal law, or
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The federal preemption doctrine has limited statutes restricting alien employment. Lower courts, however, may choose not to
reach the question of federal preemption. It is possible to consider
the question of whether the restrictive statute in question is constitutional solely on equal protection grounds. 28

B.

Equal Protection

The basis of the second major constitutional limitation upon
state legislation restricting aliens as a class in the employment
field is found in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 29 It has been firmly established that an alien, after
being admitted into the United States, is entitled to equal protection under the laws. 30 A legal resident alien is included within the
meaning of a person under the fourteenth amendment. 31 The cases
of Truax v. Raich 32 and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission 33
expanded protection of the alien by establishing equal access to
employment as a fundamental right guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 34
enforce additional or auxiliary regulations." Id. at 66-67. See also, Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
28. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
30. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), where the Court held invalid a
municipal ordinance regulating the operation of laundries because it was discriminatorily
enforced against Chinese operators; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), where the Court
held invalid an Arizona statute requiring that an employer hire at least eighty percent citizens under the fourteenth amendment; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S.
410 (1948), where a California statute barring the issuance of fishing licenses to aliens was
held to discriminate against aliens as a class.
31. The Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), stated that
[t]hese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws .... The questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore,
are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of the United States
equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of
the court.
Id. at 369. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
32. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
33. 334 u.s. 410 (1948).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. The Court in Takahaski added the further insight
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a
general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 'iri any state' on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws." 334 U.S. at 420.
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Several cases have established the standard of scrutiny to be
employed in determining whether a statute permissibly discriminates against aliens as a class. 35 The Supreme Court in Graham v.
Richardson 36 first articulated a standard of strict judicial scrutiny
to be applied to aliens classified, in a statute, as a group. The
Court held in that case that classifications based on alienage are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny .37 The
state has a heavy burden of justification to show that such a statute is "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy ." 38 Generally the Court
has continued to apply a standard of strict judicial scrutiny .39 Statutes have been struck down on the grounds that they are not
necessary to achieve the state's purpose, 40 or that the state interest is insufficient to warrant complete exclusion of all aliens. 41
Therefore, where a standard of strict scrutiny is involved, "the
governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to
be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest
is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether
the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely
drawn." 42
In contrast, in several recent decisions the Supreme Court of
the United States has .refused to apply a standard of strict judicial
scrutiny. 43 Those decisions were reached notwithstanding state
statutes discriminating against aliens as a class. 44 In those cases
35. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
36. 403 u.s. 365 (1971).
37. "[C]lassifications based on alienage ... are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny." Id. at 372. Aliens as a class have been referred to as a "discrete and insular minority." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). In McLaughlin the Court states that such classifications are subject to the "most rigid scrutiny" and "in most circumstances irrelevant to
any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose." Id. at 192. See also Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943).
38. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
39. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
40. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 724.
41. Id. at 725.
42. Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976).
43. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
44. Norwick, supra note 43, at 74; Foley, supra note 43, at 293.
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the Court applied a rational basis test. 45 When the rational basis
test is used, the statute in question is normally accorded a presumption of constitutionality which may not be disturbed unless
the enactment is shown to rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the state's objective. 46 If the rational relation
standard is used, the state no longer has the heavy burden of justifying the discriminatory statute. 47

IIL

TRADITIONAL RATIONALES JUSTIFYING
RESTRICTIVE STATE LEGISLATION

The majority of state legislation denying the alien access to
certain occupations and professions has traditionally been justified
under three broad rationales. First, through a proprietary interest
in its natural resources, a state may restrict certain occupations
derived from those resources. 48 Second, as an outgrowth of this
doctrine, a state holds a proprietary interest in certain occupations.49 Lastly, under the police power a state may regulate occupations of a dangerous or antisocial nature and make reasonable
classifications in the interest of the public health, safety and
morals. 50 Some of the different occupations and professions denied
by statute to the alien will be categorized under these three broad
rationales.

A.

The State's Proprietary Interest in Its Natural Resources

The view that a state's interest in its natural resources justifies regulation of occupations dealing with these resources is
thought to have its basis in a common law property rationale.51
. Two major Supreme Court decisions 52 restricting the right of
aliens to share in natural resources were based on the property ra45. Id.
46. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
47. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957);
Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
48. Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1012, 1014 (1957).
49. Id. at 1016-21.
50. Id. at 1021-27.
51. In England, title to game was in the King who held it for the use of his subjects.
Therefore the right to acquire game was subject to governmental authority. Id. at 1014.
52. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (killing wild game) and McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (growing oysters).
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tionale. In McCready v. Virginia 53 a Virginia statute prohibiting
anyone who was not a citizen of the state from taking or planting
oysters in certain rivers was held constitutional. The Court
reasoned that the owners of the public property of the state are
its citizens and that its use may naturally be restricted to them.
Though McCready did not directly differentiate between aliens
and citizens, it served as an important precedent for later decisions restricting the alien's right to employment. 54
Truax v. Raich 55 extended equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to aliens as to a fundamental right of employment, but the decision left open certain areas where restrictive
legislation may be considered constitutional. It was indicated by
the Court that the use of a state's natural resources could be restricted to citizens. The Court observed that a state would be
more capable of showing specific danger to its general welfare if
its natural resources are involved than if common occupations of
the community are concerned. 56
In Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 51 the Supreme Court, taking advantage of the Truax natural resources exception, found constitutional a statute which prohibited aliens from hunting for pleasure
in the state of Pennsylvania. 58 The Court found as a rational basis
for the statute that a state may protect and preserve its wild
game for its citizens. 59
Today the restriction of aliens from occupations dealing with
natural resources is no longer a constitutionally permissible state
objective. The Supreme Court, in Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission, 60 applied the rational basis test and found that a California statute barring aliens from obtaining fishing licenses 61 was
53. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
54. E.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (only citizens to build a subway); Crane v.
New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (right to contract for labor).
55. 239 u.s. 33 (1915).
56. The discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation or
distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the
people of the State, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens as
against both aliens and the citizens of other States.
Id. at 39-40.
57. 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 145-46.
60. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
61. 1945 Cal. Stats., ch. 181, currently CAL. FISH & GAME CODE§ 7149 (West).
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unconstitutional. The opinion that this type of exclusion is no
longer permissible is reinforced by the fact that the Supreme
Court has initiated a standard of strict judicial scrutiny whenever
aliens are treated as a class. 62
In addition to restricting aliens from occupations dealing with
natural resources, states have in the past successfully excluded
aliens from certain state-related occupations. Legislatures have
claimed a special proprietary interest over occupations under
State control.

B.

The State's Proprietary Interest Over Certain Occupations

A state's proprietary interest over employment positions in
government agencies and departments developed out of the common property theory. Since a state he1:s the absolute right of
ownership over the use of public property, it may be reasoned
that public employment opportunities are a privilege which a state
may grant or withhold at its own discretion. 63 The Supreme Court
in Heim v. McCall 64 considered a New York statute prohibiting the
employment of aliens on public works. The statute also prohibited
certain persons who contracted with the state from employing
aliens. 65 The statute was held to be constitutional. The Court
reasoned that it was within a state's own right to prescribe the
conditions under which public works projects are completed. 66 In
this case the condition was the exclusion of alien laborers. 67
In Crane v. New York, 68 the Court, in effect, reiterated the
view that the right to employment in public works is a privilege
rather than a right dependent on citizenship. 69 In contrast, in
C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v. Board of Education, 70 a New York
62. See discussion, supra notes 36-42.
63. See Note, supra note 48.
64. 239 u.s. 175 (1915).
65. 1909 N.Y. Laws, ch. 36, § 31 (Consol.):
§ 14: Preference in employment of persons upon public works. In the construction of public works by the state or a municipality, or by persons contracting with
the state or such municipality, only citizens of the United States shall be employed; and in all cases where laborers are employed on any such public works,
preference shall be given citizens of the state of New York.
66. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. at 191.
67. Id. at 193.
68. 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
69. Id. at 196.
70. 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 429 U.S. 1031 (1977).
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Labor Law statute 71 giving preference in the construction of public works to New York citizens was held unconstitutional. 72 The
statute displayed a preference for citizens who had been residents
of New York State for at least twelve consecutive months. 73 The
Court found within the statute an invidious classification. The lawfully admitted resident alien was put in a class with fewer privileges than were enjoyed by citizens of the state. The Court found
no compelling justification to support the statute. 74 The rightprivilege distinction and special public interest doctrines of Heim 15
and Crane 16 were held insufficient to justify the statute. 77 The
Court did not consider the state's interest in this occupation important enough to justify the exclusion. The state, the Court
reasoned, has an equal duty to all of its lawful residents including
aliens to keep unemployment as low as possible. 78
The legal resident alien's right to employment in public works
appears to have been established in New York by C.D.R. Enterprises.19 State restrictions on government occupations of a professional nature had once been justified under the right-privilege and
special public interest justifications. These justifications seem no
longer viable. 8° For this reason, occupations of a professional
nature will be examined in the next section.
C.

The State's Police Power

The legal resident alien may not be denied the right to engage in an ordinary occupation of the community under the Constitution.81 He is to be treated on equal terms with citizens wherever
the public welfare is not involved. 82 Under the police power of the
71. N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 222 (McKinney 1965).
72. 412 F. Supp. at 1172.
73. N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 222 (McKinney 1965).
74. 412 F. Supp. at 1171.
75. 239 U.S. 191 (1915).
76. 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
77. 412 F. Supp. at 1170.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Graham rejects the concept that constitutional rights turn on whether a
government benefit is a right or a privilege. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
"Taken together, Graham and Takahashi sufficiently weaken the value of Crane and Heim
as precedents for upholding state laws denying aliens government employment and, therefore, those cases can be viewed as implicitly overruled and no longer law." Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
81. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
82. Id. at 39-40.
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state, however, certain types of employment may be prohibited or
conditionally controlled. 83 A state may require a license under its
police power in order to make reasonable qualifications in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare. 84 A license may be
denied to an alien if there is some logical relation between the exclusion of the alien and the protection of the public. 85
Some states in the past have excluded aliens from employment in occupations of a dangerous or anti-social nature under the
police power. 86 In Clark v. Deckebach, 81 the Supreme Court held
that it was not unconstitutional to prohibit aliens from the operation of pool and billiard rooms by the denial of a license. 88 The
classification was held to have a rational basis because of the
Court's assumption that aliens were not as qualified as citizens to
engage in "conduct of a dubious nature." 89 The Court accepted the
view that since aliens were less likely to be familiar with local conditions, they would not be as well equipped as a citizen to deal
with the maintenance of what the court characterized as an inherently dangerous enterprise. 90 The rationale of Clarke has been
questioned, 91 but its basic holding has never been overruled. New
York State still retains the discriminatory citizenship requirement
for operation of billiard and pocket pool halls. 92
In the professional fields, which normally require licensure
under the state's police power,93 citizenship requirements in New
York are apparently based on the assumption that an alien is deficient in either his moral or educational background. The licensure
requirements leading to the exclusion of aliens were ultimately
83. See Note, supra note 48.
84. See id. at 1021-27.
85. See id. at 1021-27.
86. See id. at 1021.
87. 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 397.
90. Id.
91. In both Sugarman and In re Griffiths the Court indicated that Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), weakened the doctrinal foundations of Clarke. In
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973).
92. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 461 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79).
93. The constitutionality of statutes requiring licensure is well established in New
York State. See, e.g.. Roman v. Lobe, 213 A.D. 162, 208 N.Y.S. 617 (1925), aff'd, 150 N.E.
535, 241 N.Y. 514 (1925), aff'd, 152 N.E. 461, 243 N.Y. 51 (1926); Sockel v. Degel Yehudo, 268
A.2d 207, 49 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1944); Groetzinger v. Forest Hills Terrace Corp., 123 Misc. 274,
205 N.Y.S. 125 (1924).
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designed to protect the public from the ineptitude, inexperience or
dishonesty of persons not qualified to practice a particular profession.94
An example of a restricted profession is the field of real
estate brokerage. Licensure there is thought to be helpful in the
prevention of fraud upon the trusting public 95 and in assuring competency and observance of professional conduct in a relationship
which presents many opportunities to extract illicit gains by concealment and collusion. 96
Though regulation through licensing is necessary to protect
the public interest, statutes similar to the New York legislation requiring brokers to be citizens 97 may be unconstitutional. Assuming
that real estate brokerage is a "common occupation of the community"98 and that a standard of strict scrutiny is judicially applied, it is likely that the statute would be declared invalid. The
case of Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Commission, 99 affirmed on
appeal by the Supreme Court, confirms this view. In Satoskar
plaintiffs successfully challenged the constitutionality of an Indiana statute precluding aliens from applying for or obtaining real
estate licenses.
There should be an increased awareness in the courts of the
unconstitutional nature of many of these restrictive licensure requirements.100 California, in contrast to New York, has taken firm
action toward the abolishment of such requirements. 101 The opinion of the California Attorney General states that, in the absence
of a reasonable connection between the requirements of citizenship and an individual's fitness to practice a given profession or
94. Dodge v. Richmond, 5 A.D.2d 593, 173 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1958).
95. Id. The statute involved in this case relating to the licensing of real estate brokers
and salesmen was designed to "protect the public from inept, inexperienced or dishonest
persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of frauds upon it, and to establish
protective or qualifying standards to that end." Id. at 787-88.
96. In re Wilson Sullivan Co., 289 N.Y. 110, 44 N.E.2d 387, 33 N.Y.S. 203 (1942).
97. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 440(a) (McKinney 1968).
98. See discussion, supra notes 36-42. In view of Griffiths, the State Department is no
longer enforcing the requirement though it has not yet been repealed by the legislature.
Letter from New York Department of State to Claire M. Schenk (November 2, 1978).
99. 417 u.s. 938 (197 4).
100. See discussion, supra notes 8 & 84; infra note 101.
101. California has repealed a statute similar to N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 440(a) (McKinney 1968), CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10150.5 (West) (repealed 1972) which was repealed in
addition to other citizenship requirements dealing with common occupations of the community.
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vocation, United States citizenship is not a valid requirement for
professional licensure and such a requirement would be violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 102
This opinion is based on Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State 103
where the California Supreme Court found that a classification
which discriminates arbitrarily on the basis of status has no rational basis. Purdy holds that it is not a legitimate interest to
favor United States citizens. The California court indicated that a
statute justified by this reason will fail notwithstanding whether a
standard of strict scrutiny is applied .104
Several recent New York cases 105 indicate that the New York
courts may be gradually moving toward a viewpoint similar to
California. In Surmeli v. New York, 106 the constitutionality of New
York Education Law§ 6524(6) 107 was challenged by eight Turkish
physicians who were residents of New York and had been licensed
to practice under the statute. Each was now being excluded from
his profession for failure to have become a citizen as required
within a statutory time period of ten years from the date of licensure. The district court for the South District of New York found
that there was no rational basis for the requirement of continued
licensure as the physicians had already been qualified and licensed
and had demonstrated professional competency for a significant
time period. The state's argument that a political commitment to
the United States was desirable and necessary to promote stability for his patient's welfare was rejected by the court. 108
102. 55 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 80 (1972).
103. Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, 71Cal.2d 566, 456 P .2d 645, 79 Cal. Rpt r. 77 (1969).
104. Id.
105. 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N .Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F'.2d 560 (2d Cir . 1976), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 903 (1978); Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
106. 412 F . Supp. at 394.
107. N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 6524(6) (McKinney 1972), which requires that in order to qualify
for a license as a physician an applicant must " . .. be a United States citizen, or file a
declaration of intention to become a citizen, unless such requirement is waived, in accordance with the commissioner's regulations .... "This section replaced former§ 6509 (repealed
1971) which stated:
There shall be issued to an applicant who, when admitted to the licensing examination, was a citizen of a foreign country, and who had declared intention of
becoming a citizen of the United States, upon passing the examination, a license
but upon failure of such licensee within ten years from the date of such declaration
of intention to furnish evidence that he has become a citizen his license shall terminate and his registration shall be annulled.
N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 6509 (McKinney) (repealed 1971).
108. 412 F. Supp. at 397.
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In Kulkarni v. Nyquist,1° 9 the holding of Surmeli 110 was broadened. Kulkarni held several citizenship requirements to be unconstitutional because of their denial to aliens of access to certain
professions. m This case, unlike Surmeli, did not involve professionals who had already demonstrated their competency through
years of practice but did involve qualified aliens desiring to enter
certain professions. Though the court found the citizenship requirements clearly unconstitutional, it refused to certify those
aliens as the representatives of a class of qualified legal resident
aliens denied access to professions through citizenship requirements. This decision is indicative of an attitude of conservatism in
New York courts. In choosing to consider requirements on a purely
case-by-case basis the judiciary may be preserving an option to
withdraw protection of the employment rights of legal resident
aliens.

IV. CURRENT RATIONALE JUSTIFYING
RESTRICTIVE STATE LEGISLATION
New York courts may find a possible avenue of retreat from
the expanded protection of the employment rights of the legal
resident alien by relying on the rationale of Sugarman v. Dougall. 112
In Sugarman, the Supreme Court applied a standard of strict judicial scrutiny and held invalid a New York Civil Service statute 113
which prohibited non-United States citizens from holding permanent positions in competitive classes of the state civil service. 114
Although the Court held this particular discriminatory statute to
be unconstitutional in this decision, it stated that there may be
certain situations where a state may be justified in excluding
aliens from certain types of employment. 115 The type of occupation
109. 446 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
110. 412 F. Supp. at 397-98.
111. 446 F. Supp. at 1271; N.Y. Eouc. LAW§§ 6534 (physical therapists) and 7206 (engineers) (McKinney 1972).
112. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
113. N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAW§ 53 (McKinney 1973).
114. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
115. We do not hold that, on the basis of an individualized determination, an alien
may not be refused, or discharged from, public employment, even on the basis of
noncitizenship, if the refusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on legitimate state interests that relate to qualifications for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee ....
Neither do we hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of
positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office .... Such power inheres
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with which the Court is concerned is of a political nature, particularly where important elective and non-elective state positions are
involved. 116
The notion of the necessity of the preservation of "the basic
conception of a political community" 111 is not new to New York. 118
The political rights of aliens have been restricted in New York for
a significant period of time. 119 Aliens are not allowed to hold public
office, 120 to vote, 121 or to serve on juries. 122 The citizenship requirement for jurors is well established and has been upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States as recently as 1976. 123 In
Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, 124 the Court stated
that a jury was an institution at the heart of the country's system
of government. The Court indicated that an alien, specifically
because of his status as a non-citizen, was unable to serve. 125
In Foley v. Connelie, 126 the political exception in Sugarman
was used to uphold a New York statute 121 excluding aliens from
employment as state troopers. The Supreme Court indicated that
a standard of strict judicial scrutiny would not be applied where
rights and privileges involving an alien's participation in the
democratic processes were concerned. 128 Political policy making
in the State by virtue of its obligation ... 'to preserve the basic conception of a
political community' .... And this power and responsibility of the State applies,
not only to the qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who
participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy
perform functions that go the heart of representative government.
413 U.S. at 646-47.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 647.
118. "New York accordingly, acted during the first fifty years of independence to
refine its 'political community.'" Brief for Appellee at 18, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1
(1977).
119. "By 1825 it was clear that aliens were excluded from public office, voting and jury
service.'' Id.; 1825 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 307, § 4.
120. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW§ 3 (McKinney 1952).
121. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
122. N.Y. Juo. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1975); N.Y. C1v. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney
1976).
123. Perkins v. Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
124. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
125. Id. at 332.
126. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
127. N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
128. The Court in Foley stated: "The State need only justify its classification by a
showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the
limiting classification.'' 435 U.S. at 296.
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aspects of a state trooper's job were emphasized by the Court in
finding that citizenship is a compelling and necessary requirement.129 The New York decision, the Court felt, indicated that an
alien would be less "personally committed to the proper application and enforcement of the laws of the United States" than a citizen.130 The underlying assumption is that an alien is less interested
in the preservation of the state than a citizen. The Court was also
concerned that an alien may potentially encounter a conflict of
loyalties. 131 The decision recognizes that a state may reasonably
presume a citizen to be more familiar with, and sympathetic to,
American traditions than an alien. 132 This rationale has been rejected by a number of cases. 133 Those courts have asserted that an
alien is no less capable of understanding American law or appreciating American institutions or being loyal and committed to the
United States than is a citizen. 134
The choice of the Court in Foley to draw an analogy between
state troopers and jurors is also subject to criticism. A comparison
between the duties of a policeman and those of an attorney 135
would bear a much greater similarity. Both involve long term commitments to a profession dealing with the law. It appears that the
Court in Foley has glossed over the many mechanical, routine
functions of a state trooper. A state trooper has an obligation to
enforce, but not to create, the law.
The dissent in Foley acknowledges the inconsistency between
Griffiths and Foley. 136 It also points out that the majority based its
holding upon language which is essentially dictum. 137 Crucial to the
majority's decision is its characterization of the job of a state
trooper as a policy-making position. Nowhere, however, is the line
between policy making and non-policy making positions drawn in a
clear and consistent fashion. 138
129. Id. at 297-98.
130. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
131. Id. at 897-98.
132. 435 U.S. at 299-300.
133. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); In re Park, 484 P.2d 690 (1971); Raffaelli v.
Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264 (1972) (en bane).
134. Id.
135. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
136. "Unless the Court repudiates its holding in In re Griffiths, ... it must reject any
conclusive presumption that aliens, as a class, are disloyal or untrustworthy." Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 308 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. 435 U.S. at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. 435 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The decision in Foley also shows some inconsistencies with
the decision in Nyquist v. Mauclet. 139 In Mauclet, the Supreme
Court held a New York statute 140 barring resident aliens from
state financial assistance for higher education to be in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 141 Although this case dealt with an alien's right to an education rather
than employment, the Supreme Court discussed the political exception of Sugarman. 142 The Court, in speaking of the narrow
scope of the exception in Foley, states that, "as Sugarman makes
quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters, or of 'elective
or important nonelective' officials 'who participate directly in the
formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy."' 143
Perhaps the inconsistency between the decisions of the Court
in Griffiths and Mauclet in light of Foley may be explained by a
change in attitude on the part of the Court. The Court seems to be
placing a heavier emphasis on the importance of the rights, benefits, and privileges of citizenship than on the employment rights of
the legal resident alien. This possibility is recognized by Justice
Stewart in his concurring opinion in Foley:
The dissenting opinions convincingly demonstrate that it is
difficult if not impossible to reconcile the Court's judgment in
this case with the full sweep of the reasoning and authority of
some of our past decisions. It is only because I have become increasingly doubtful about the validity of those decisions (in at
least some of which I concurred) that I join in the opinion of the
Court in this case. 144

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ambach v. Noralso suggests the possibility that the Court may be retracting the scope of employment rights previously granted to the legal
resident alien. In Norwick the Court overturned the decision of
the New York Southern District Court. 146 The lower court, in that
wick145

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

432 U.S. 1 (1977).
N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 661(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
432 U.S. at 12.
413 U.S. at 646-47.
432 U.S. at 11.
435 U.S. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring).
441 U.S. 68 (1979).
Id.
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case, found a New York statute 147 which required public school
teachers to be United States citizens unconstitutional. 148 Although
the New York court had examined the statute with strict scrutiny ,149 the Supreme Court only looked to the statute for a rational
basis. 150 The Supreme Court made an initial determination that
teaching in public schools constitutes a governmental function. 151
It then proceeded to the conclusion that the statute bears a rational relationship to the State's interest of furthering its educational goals. 152
The Court's decision in Norwick is subject to a number of
criticisms. As the dissent in that case points out, "it is logically impossible to differentiate between this case concerning teachers
and In re Griffiths concerning attorneys." 153 The majority in Norwick attempts to counter this point. New York's citizenship requirement is limited to a governmental function because it applies
only to teachers employed by and acting as agents of the state. In
contrast, the Connecticut statute, held unconstitutional in In re
Griffiths, applied to all attorneys though most do not work for the
government. The exclusion of aliens from access to the bar involved the right to pursue a chosen occupation rather than access
to public employment. 154
An analysis of the Norwick decision shows a few weaknesses
in the court's line of reasoning. First, the exclusion does not refer
to the substance of the occupation. In determining whether a
governmental function is involved, a teacher's duties are of
greater import than the status of a teacher as a state employee.
Second, the fact that teachers are state employees is not a proper
basis to distinguish them from attorneys. "States owe all of their
lawful residents, whether aliens or citizens, equal access to public
as well as private employment, absent the necessity for restrictions designed to promote compelling state interests." 155
Both Norwick and Foley have a potentially far reaching effect
in the area of state legislative restrictions of the employment
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 3001(3) (McKinney 1970).
Ambach v. Norwick sub nom Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. at 922.
Id. at 918.
441 U.S. 80 (1979).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting).
Id. at 76 n.6.
417 F. Supp. at 981 n.9.
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right of the legal resident alien. Legislative repeal or amendment
of restrictive statutes may slow or cease as a result of these decisions. New restrictive legislation may proliferate. Absent limits
on the state's power to classify employment as a political relationship, a new mode of infringement upon employment rights of the
legal resident alien may result. It is noteworthy that the decision
in Foley has already been adopted by at least one lower New York
court. In Di Franco v. City of New York, 156 a New York court
upheld a code requirement 157 which barred aliens from becoming
policemen.
An example of the potentially wide scope of the political exception is found in the California case of Chavez-Salido v. Cabell. 158
In that case the state attempted to justify a restriction on a significant range of occupations which involve the powers of a peace
officer. 159 Those occupations include superintendents of cemeteries
as well as sheriffs. 160
The issue may be even further compounded. If a court determines that an occupation fits within the hazy boundaries of the
political exception, a restrictive statute itself will only be examined to determine whether it has a rational relationship to the
state's interest. 161 At that stage the statute is most likely to withstand constitutional challenge. 162 It has been observed that "several
recent decisions addressing the issue of aliens' right to work indicate that the suspect class status of alienage is slowly eroding. As
a result, it is possible that state action against aliens will no longer
be strictly scrutinized ...." 163 A return to the rational basis standard of scrutiny presents a serious threat to the established employment rights of the legal resident alien.

V.

CONCLUSION

The current constitutional status of New York statutes which
restrict certain types of employment to citizens has been placed in
156. DiFranco v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 852, 389 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1976).
157. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE Tit. A, ch. 18, § 434a-8.0 (1963).
158. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded,
436 U.S. 901 (1978).
159. 427 F. Supp. at 170.
160. 427 F. Supp. at 169-70, note 22.
161. See Ambach v. Norwick, supra note 43; Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
162. See discussion, supra notes 43-47.
163. Comment, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 835, 838 (1977).
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a state of flux by the decisions in Norwick and Foley. Before these
cases were decided, it appeared that statutes which discriminated
against aliens as a class would be examined with close judicial
scrutiny .164 Any retreat from a standard of strict judicial scrutiny
would result in a reduction of the already established employment
rights of the legal resident alien. Although Norwick and Foley indicate a retraction of employment rights, they may be explained
or distinguished by the unique type of employment in each case.
A refinement of the distinction between policy and non-policy
making occupations is needed. The over-expansive political exception of Sugarman is unwarranted. Most of New York's restrictive
statutes relate to common occupations of the community. Such
statutes are unconstitutional, and it is recommended that they
either be repealed by the New York legislature or be judicially invalidated by the New York courts. Those official bodies should
limit rather than promote the threatening trend against the established employment rights of the legal resident alien.

Claire M. Schenk
164. See discussion, supra notes 35-42.
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